

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

2 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


FROM : Charles E. Waterman, Vice Chairman
National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Conference on Longer Range Issues

1. We are commencing a series of half-day conferences on longer range assumptions underlying United States views and policies on various issues. These are joint State Policy Planning/NIC productions and will be attended by about a dozen individuals selected from various agencies and cleared outsiders. We have agreed to hold these conferences when events have reached a threshold in a given area such that basic premises merit reexamination.

2. Our first venture will be on the Middle East on 8 December and will devote one hour each to the attached issues, which may be of interest to you. A limited distribution written summary will be produced. Steve Bosworth and I will cochair the sessions.

3. We tentatively intend our next conference to concentrate on Western Europe.



Charles E. Waterman

Attachment

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1. Is a "solution" or at least a substantial amelioration of the Palestinian problem essential to US interests, or will it gradually become less of a potent irritant if merely left to evolve? Will the Palestinian movement grow into a true insurgency without "settlement," or will a process of accommodation occur? How does Syria's increasing control of the Palestine movement affect this situation? (The prevailing US assumption, including that which underlay Camp David, is that a Palestinian resolution is central to US interests and will become more, not less of an irritant.) Introductions: Five minutes each. [redacted] Tom Wukitch (INR)
2. Is there a degree of flexibility to be found anywhere in the Israeli body politic which realistically offers the likelihood of a compromise on the West Bank/Gaza/Jerusalem acceptable to even moderate Arabs? Is the basic trend in Israel toward greater or lesser flexibility? Does US credibility remain sufficiently strong with both Arabs and Israelis to affect this trend. (The prevailing US assumption is that such flexibility exists in liberal Israeli circles, under certain circumstances, and that we retain credibility). Introductions: Five minutes each. Geoffry Kemp (NSC); Dennis Ross (Office of Net Assessment-DoD)
3. With the passage of time and continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under what kinds of conditions would the current Israeli military advantage be threatened? Is the future orientation of Egypt sufficiently in doubt to be a factor? Would proliferation of nuclear weapons to the area (e.g., Iraq, Libya, or Pakistan) decisively change these calculations? In other words, is time on Israel's side in the Middle East? [redacted]
[redacted] Introductions: Five minutes each. Don Fortier (NSC); [redacted]
[redacted] (Defense Intelligence Officer-DIA)
4. Would substantial Western disengagement from Lebanon lead to an intolerable situation for Western interests? Has the fact of US and Western involvement during the past year irrevocably endowed Lebanon with a critical importance beyond that of purely regional considerations. Would a Western disengagement be likely to produce a new Arab-Israeli war? Introductions: Five minutes each. Graham Fuller (National Intelligence Officer-Near East and South Asia); Peter Rodman (State Policy Planning)

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SUBJECT: Conference on Longer Range Issues (NIC 8701-83)

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